In this paper we show that the generational accounting frame work used to measure tax incidence can give inaccurate measurement of tax burden imbalances across cohorts. We find that it is possible to construct tax policy reforms consistent with the same pattern of consumption, work effort, and utility across generations, but with different tax burden measurements when using the standard generational accounting procedure. This result is very important for policy evaluation, since it shows that the selection of tax policies based on generational accounts could potentially be misleading. In addition, we provide an alternative procedure robust to the choice of tax instruments.
Introduction
The reduction in fertility and the increase in life expectancy combined with the post-war baby boom phenomenon will create economi c challenges in the coming years. The demographic transition will not only have an important impact in the labor markets, and the social insurance programs such as Social Security and Medicare, but it will also affect tax revenue collection. One can discuss the magnitude of the fiscal adjustments based on projected demographics, but the ultimate and relevant question is how should we distribute the tax burden of our aging population across different cohorts. The answer is determined by issues of intergenerational equity and economic efficiency. However, prior to determine the tax incidence for present and future generations, it is important to understand how to measure the tax burden. Our paper contributes to clarify the measurement of tax incidence across different cohorts over time.
The most popular approach 2 to the measurement of generational tax incidence is the generational accounting framework developed by Auerback, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) . The accounting procedure requires to rewrite the governme nt intertemporal budget constraint in terms of the fiscal incidence and the transfer programs received by each generation. Assuming that taxes and transfers remain unchanged, they calculate the net tax burden that future generations have to bear to achieve long-term balance in the government budget constraint. Any structural change in the tax policy has to be captured by a change in the fiscal incidence and transfers received by each generation, and that implies a different measurement for present and future generations.
The advantage of the technique is that the measurement of the tax burden is relatively easy to compute since it does not require specific assumptions about functional forms for individual preferences or technology. 3 It is sufficient to determine an intertemporal discount rate so the tax burden paid by future generations can be directly compared with the current ones. That explains the widespread use for policy analysis in practice (Board of Governors, Department of Treasure, World Bank,…) to assess the burden of future demographics or the impact of policy reforms. Two of the limitations of the generational accounting framework are that it ignores the impact of taxation on economic activity, and it omits the welfare gains and losses resulting from fiscal reforms. To address this critique Fehr and Kotlikoff (1996) measured the fiscal incidence implied by the generational accounts in a dynamic general equilibrium life -cycle model. They find that generational accounts match the evolution of welfare changes for each cohort, but they miss the magnitude of the utility changes. They argue that the bias is quantitatively small when the capital to output ratio that pins down relative prices does not change much.
In this paper we show that the measurement of the tax burden across cohorts implied by the generational accounts does not give an accurate description of generational imbalances since it is not robust to the choice of tax instruments. We argue that it is possible to construct neutral policy reforms (i.e. same consumption, hours worked, and utility distributions) using different policy instruments, and that as a result they would generate different measurements of the tax burden using the generational accounting approach. The implications of this result are rather important for policy evaluation. It is possible to evaluate different tax reforms to solve future fiscal imbalances that provide different costs when measured using generational accounts, but that are in fact equivalent in welfare terms . We show that it is possible to construct a robust alternative measurement approach, equally simple in its implementation, based on the consumer intertemporal budget constraint. To quantify the size of the bias we use a standard lifecycle model and compare the generational accounts implied by the baseline model with the ones associated to a Pareto neutral social security reform (as in Conesa and Garriga (2008a) ). We find that the quantitative bias is as large as 15 percent across reforms, and much larger when compared to our alternative measurement procedure.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly summarize the methodology of generational accounting and its applications. In section 3, we prove the main result of the paper in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model. In section 4, we build a quantitative policy reform to illustrate the discrepancies in generational accounts. In section 5, we summarize the paper findings and conclude.
Generational Accounting
The generational accounting framework was developed by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) with the objective of measuring the generational incidence of tax policy independent of fiscal taxonomy labels (see Kotlikoff (1992 Kotlikoff ( , 2001 ) for a full description of the methodology). The approach compares the lifetime ( net of transfers) tax bills between present and future cohorts, and it is regularly used in order to measure the generational impact of changes in fiscal policy. All these different tax burden measures can be compared independently of how fiscal deficits are calculated. An important aspect of generational accounting is the impact of the evolution of population demographics in the government budget constraint and the measurement of generational imbalances. The ultimate goal is to prescribe tax policies that could correct any imbalance, so all generations bear a similar tax burden.
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Methodology
For the description of the methodology of generational accounting we closely follow Kotlikoff (2001) .
The tax burden in period t of a cohort born in period k is measured as: implied by a model all these elements are clearly specified. However, if we are using data as input the process is a bit more involved (Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Gokhale (2001) provide a detailed description of how to map the data into the generational accounts), since it includes expenditures in health care, education, and other form of transfer programs. However, it does not impute to any specific cohort the value of government expenditure in goods and services. The main reason is the difficulty to assign the benefit of government purchases to different generations. The choice of the discount rate R deserves special attention, since it influences the generational accounts for present and future generations. The choice becomes even more problematic in the presence of varying rates or uncertainty because it would in principle require the use of the term structure or the use of some specific stochastic discount factor to adjust for risk. Moreover, in the presence of incomplete markets risk adjustment should be cohort specific. However, in practice it is standard to use a benchmark constant discount rate, and present the results under alternative constant discount rates. Keeping the discounting constant can be restrictive because the capital-output ratio that ultimately determines interest rates may be varying in the presence of demographic shocks.
Generational Accounts Imbalances
Given the tax burden for the current generations and the sequence of future expenditures, it is possible to calculate as a residual the tax payments of future generations. In the presence of imbalances ,, (2000) analyze the case of the U.S. using the long-term projections of
The Congressional Budget Office. They use a 4 percent discount rate and 2.2 percent of productivity growth, and they find that future generations will face a lifetime burden that is 41.6 percent higher than the existing generations. They propose five alternative policies. The first is a 31 percent permanent increase in federal and personal corporate income taxes. The second is a 12 percent raise of all federal, state, and local taxes. The third one requires to cut all transfers programs (Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, unemployment insurance benefits, housing support, etc...) by 21.9 percent.
The final two options require the reduc tion of all government expenditures by 21 percent, or federal expenditure by 66.3 percent. Other applications include a swift from income to consumption taxation as in Altig, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) , or social security privatization such as Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) . The methodology has also been applied to other countries such as the U.K. in Cardarelli, Kotlikoff, and Sefton (2000) . For an international study we refer to Kotlikoff and Raffelheuschen (1991) .
Measuring Tax Incidence
In this section we use a general equilibrium model with two purposes. First, we illustrate that the generational accounts can be biased since they are not robust to the choice of tax instruments. Second, we propose a robust alternative based on the consumer intertemporal budget constraint. This new measure is equally simple in its implementation and is robust to the choice of tax instruments. To construct this new measure, we use a fairly general overlapping generations model with production. We describe these steps in detail.
A Standard Life-Cycle Model
Generations Individuals supply their labor services and assets in competitive markets. Then, individuals receive a competitive wage, t w , per efficiency unit of labor supplied in period t . They also hold assets , it a in the form of physical capital or government bonds in exchange for a market rental rate, t r . Clearly the return of both investments has to be the same if households are to hold both types of assets. We denote the transfer payments received by cohort j as , jt m . Notice that allows for transfers to change over the lifecycle. 6 We assume that markets are complete. Therefore households are allowed to trade assets to smooth consumption over the life-cycle. There are two potential extensions from the standard model. One would be to introduce intragenerational heterogeneity, and the second would be to introduce mortality risk with or without annuity markets. The findings in the paper do not depend on neither of these two model features.
The production possibility frontier is represented by a constant returns to scale . We will take the sequence of government consumption to be exogenously specified. The period resource constraint is then 
Model Generational Accounts
To construct the generational accounts for each cohort, we have to determine the net tax outlets (taxes minus transfers properly discounted) for each generation.
In our model environment the GA of every newborn generation is given by It is important to remark that individual generational accounts are just a metric to measure tax incidence and would not necessarily be related to the equilibrium in the model. In equilibrium, the government intertemporal budget constraint is always satisfied. However, the implied individual generational accounts and imbalances do not have to be consistent with the government budget constraint unless we use the market discount rate. We simply use the model to generate data that then is used to measure tax incidence by constructing generational accounts.
The Tax Incidence Measurement Bias of Generational Accounts
To illustrate the measurement bias of the tax incidence implied by the generational accounts, it is useful to state and prove a well-known equivalence result. Then, we use this equivalence to show that the generational accounting measurements are not identical across equivalent tax policies. Moreover, the associated generational accounts would in general differ between policy ( ,,) mB τ and policy (,,) mB τ % %% .
Proof: Any equilibrium allocation must satisfy the following first order conditions: 
∑∑∑
Clearly there is more than one policy that can implement the same allocation, since there are 2* J equations and there are 4* J fiscal variables to determine given an allocation.
Given an alternative fiscal policy, assets can then be constructed directly from the sequential budget constraints . Notice then tha t aggregate wealth would change, and as a consequence government debt changes since the aggregate capital stock is unchanged.
Finally, the new level of government debt must necessarily balance the government budget constraint by Walras' Law.
In general, the associated generational accounts measurement would change, even though allocations and hence welfare are the same . In order to see that the generational accounts must change for at least one generation it suffices to recall Equation (): 
Notice that since aggregate debt in general changes across equivalent policies the right hand side must change. Therefore the left hand side must change as well. n This result has two important implications.
9 From the positive point of view, the measurement of tax incidence implied by generational accounts does not provide an accurate description (or invariant metric) of generational imbalances of the effective tax burden faced by different cohorts. From a normative point of view, the evaluation of tax policies based on the distribution of tax burden for different cohorts could mislead the true cost for each cohort. Our results show that we could be evaluating the implied tax incidence of different policies on different cohorts and using the generational accounts to conclude that one policy does a better job than other. Nevertheless, these policies could be equivalent from the household perspective, but the generational accounts would lead to a different conclusion.
Generational Accounting Based on the Households' Intertemporal Budget Constraint
One of the main problems in using the generational accounts to measure generational imbalances is the tax treatment of savings. The main result from Proposition 1 states that any equivalent tax policy that requires a different distribution of asset holdings, that includes claims on capital and government debt, is going to lead to different generational accounts.
One way to avoid the problem is to measure tax incidence using the intertemporal budget constraint and effective rather than nominal tax distortions. The idea is very simple, if the tax policies are equivalent the intertemp oral budget constraints have to be the same, otherwise consumption-leisure plans would differ. Then, we should measure the magnitude of all the effective taxes paid using the consolidated budget constraint and not what is recorded in the government books.
This alternative procedure can be described as follows. Consider the sequential budget constraint:
9 There are a few remarks to the proposition. First, notice that the different tax reforms consistent with the proposition might imply a change in statutory tax rates (with the same effective tax wedges), a change in the magnitudes of intergenerational transfers, or both. Second, the result still holds in the presence of borrowing constraint of some form. The proof is very general and holds in a larger class of economies that include uncertainty and certain forms of market frictions. It is sufficient to have a non-empty set of equivalent policies. 
Quantitative Assessment of the Tax Incidence Bias
In this section we want to measure the potential size of the tax incidence bias and compare it to our proposed robust measure. In general it is difficult to characterize the equilibrium path and the optimal decision rules for a given tax policy. In the absence of a closed form solution, we use numerical methods to simulate the policy reforms and compute the implied generational accounts.
As an illustration we perform a Pareto neutral social security privatization that transforms the unfunded system into a funded one with private accounts following Conesa and Garriga (2008a) . The tax incidence bias can be measured as the difference between the implied generational accounts across social security regimes, and also comparing the magnitudes with the robust measure.
Parameterization
Next we determine the choice of functional forms and parameters for the model simulation.
Functional forms:
We pose a standard log utility function between consumption and leisure:
(,)ln(1)ln(1) uclcl γγ =+−− where γ represents the consumption share on the utility function.
The aggregate technology is a standard constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas:
where α represents the capital income share in output. We assume that capital depreciates at a constant rate δ and there is no exogenous technological growth.
Population structure and income:
A model period is equivalent to one year. Given our period choice we assume households live for 65 periods, so that the economically active life of a household starts at age 20 and we assume that households die with certainty at age 85. In the benchmark economy households retire in period 45 (equivalent to age 65 in years). Finally, we normalize the mass of households to be one. We assume that households are endowed with one unit of time. The lifetime profile of efficiency units is constructed using the Current Population Survey data (CPS).
Government policy:
The level of government expenditure is exogenously specified as a fraction of output. Revenues come from capital and labor income taxes, and from consumption taxes. In addition the government runs a pay-as-you-go social security system in the benchmark policy scenario. We assume that the tax on capital income is 33 percent, social security contributions are 10.5 percent, and consumption taxes are 5 percent. The labor income tax is chosen to balance the government budget given the target level of outstanding government debt.
Given the assumptions on the functional forms, endowments and tax rates, we jointly solve for the equilibrium and the parameterization using and minimum distance method.
The next table, defines the parameter values and the targets. We define aggregate capital to be the level of Fixed Assets in the BEA statistics. The implied capital to output ratio is 3. Government debt is defined as federal, state and local, with an implied ratio to GDP of 0.5. Firms' depreciation rate is chosen to match an investment to output ratio of 16 percent. Another target is the average number of hours worked over the life-cycle, the target is an average of 1/3 of the time of households allocated to market activities. The ratio of government expenditure to GDP is determined to be 20 percent.
A Pareto Neutral Social Security Reform
The fiscal reform we examine follows Conesa and Garriga (2008a) , and it serves the purpose of illustrating the measurement discrepancies generated by the standard procedure of generational accounting. The idea is to implement a privatization of the social security system while maintaining the level of distortions from the baseline economy. 10 The timing of events works as follows. We assume that at time 1 the economy is in steady state with an unfunded social security system. The contributions made by the young generate an entitlement to a future benefit upon retirement, which constitutes an implicit debt of the social security administration towards them. Upon retirement, these retirees receive their claims .
The reform is implemented at 2 t = . The government eliminates pensions giving compensatory transfers to all households. These household specific transfers are financed with government debt. The privatization effectively transforms the implicit debt of the social security system into explicit debt, but real allocations and welfare remain unchanged. The resulting distribution of wealth is different, since now social security implicit claims are transformed into explicit assets in the hands of households. Figure 1 compares both distributions of wealth. The asset distribution under the funded system is always above the unfunded one, since now workers use the proceedings from social security contributions to invest in private savings accounts. The youngest cohort receives as a transfer an initial level of assets that is equivalent to the net present value of social security transfers. This number ensures that the consumer intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied. The difference between the newly issued government bonds and the initial outstanding government debt determines the implicit debt of the social security system. Figure 2 represents the net taxes paid over the life cycle in these two equivalent policy regimes. 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 GA Funded
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Notice that the standard generational accounting procedure is not invariant between these two equivalent policy regimes since the two curves on Figure 3 do not lie on top of each other. To the contrary, the implied values have a bias that can be as high as 15 percent for the young and middle age cohorts. The bias is purely driven by the fact that government bond holdings are larger in the funded regime, while they are not net wealth. Since capital income (coming from holding government debt or financial assets) is taxed, the imputed tax burden varies across the two policy regimes. However, the proceedings from selling the government bonds are by construction equal to the transfers received from the social security system. The distinction is that under the equivalent policy transfers are computed as a taxable asset and a liability for the government that remains forever, whereas in the other case is a net transfer from the government and funded by workers' contributions (but an implicit liability for the government). Next, we compare this standard measurement with our proposed robust measure for generational accounts. The generational accounting procedure we propose is based on the intertemporal households' budget constraint, and therefore only accounts for the tax treatment of capital and consumption insofar as they affect the relative price of consumption across time.
Also, the measure only considers the effective distortion in the labor supply net of the government transfers received in the corresponding period. As a consequence, the new measure predicts a lower tax burden for all households except for households in their last period.
Notice the large bias of the previous two measurements ("GA Funded" and "GA Unfunded") when compared with the proposed generational accounting metric based on the intertemporal budget constraint. We claim that the new metric is not only robust to the choice of tax instruments , but it is also easier to calculate since it requires less information.
Conclusions
In 25 years the U.S. economy will have twice as many retirees but only twenty percent more workers. This demographic transition surely will have an important effect in the government budget unless the benefits from Social Security and Medicare are reduced.
The determination of which cohorts are going to bear the cost is very important, but first we need to agree on how to measure generational imbalances.
In the paper we show that the standard generational accounting procedure gives an inaccurate measurement of tax burden imbalances across cohorts. We find that it is possible to construct tax policy reforms consistent with the same pattern of consumption, work effort, and utility across generations, but yield different tax burden measurements when using generational accounting. This result is very important for policy evaluation, since it shows that the selection of tax policies based on generational accounts can be biased.
We quantify the potential bias introduced by the methodology, at the same time that we provide a robust alternative, equally simple in its implementation.
